Code:
/ 4.0 / 4.0 / DEVDIV_TFS / Dev10 / Releases / RTMRel / ndp / fx / src / Net / System / Net / Mail / SmtpNegotiateAuthenticationModule.cs / 1305376 / SmtpNegotiateAuthenticationModule.cs
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
//
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
namespace System.Net.Mail
{
using System;
using System.Collections;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Security.Permissions;
using System.ComponentModel;
using System.Security.Authentication.ExtendedProtection;
internal class SmtpNegotiateAuthenticationModule : ISmtpAuthenticationModule
{
Hashtable sessions = new Hashtable();
internal SmtpNegotiateAuthenticationModule()
{
}
#region ISmtpAuthenticationModule Members
// Security this method will access NetworkCredential properties that demand UnmanagedCode and Environment Permission
[EnvironmentPermission(SecurityAction.Assert, Unrestricted=true)]
[SecurityPermission(SecurityAction.Assert, Flags=SecurityPermissionFlag.UnmanagedCode)]
public Authorization Authenticate(string challenge, NetworkCredential credential, object sessionCookie, string spn, ChannelBinding channelBindingToken)
{
if(Logging.On)Logging.Enter(Logging.Web, this, "Authenticate", null);
try {
lock (this.sessions)
{
NTAuthentication clientContext = this.sessions[sessionCookie] as NTAuthentication;
if (clientContext == null)
{
if(credential == null){
return null;
}
this.sessions[sessionCookie] =
clientContext =
new NTAuthentication(false, "Negotiate", credential, spn,
ContextFlags.Connection | ContextFlags.InitIntegrity, channelBindingToken);
}
byte[] byteResp;
string resp = null;
if (!clientContext.IsCompleted) {
// If auth is not yet completed keep producing
// challenge responses with GetOutgoingBlob
SecurityStatus statusCode;
byte[] decodedChallenge = null;
if (challenge != null) {
decodedChallenge =
Convert.FromBase64String(challenge);
}
byteResp = clientContext.GetOutgoingBlob(
decodedChallenge,
false,
out statusCode);
// Note sure why this is here...keeping it.
if (clientContext.IsCompleted && byteResp == null) {
resp = "\r\n";
}
if (byteResp != null) {
resp = Convert.ToBase64String(byteResp);
}
} else {
// If auth completed and still have a challenge then
// server may be doing "correct" form of GSSAPI SASL.
// Validate incoming and produce outgoing SASL security
// layer negotiate message.
resp = GetSecurityLayerOutgoingBlob(
challenge,
clientContext);
}
return new Authorization(resp, clientContext.IsCompleted);
}
}
finally {
if(Logging.On)Logging.Exit(Logging.Web, this, "Authenticate", null);
}
}
public string AuthenticationType
{
get
{
return "gssapi";
}
}
public void CloseContext(object sessionCookie) {
NTAuthentication clientContext = null;
lock (sessions) {
clientContext = sessions[sessionCookie] as NTAuthentication;
if (clientContext != null) {
sessions.Remove(sessionCookie);
}
}
if (clientContext != null) {
clientContext.CloseContext();
}
}
#endregion
// Function for SASL security layer negotiation after
// authorization completes.
//
// Returns null for failure, Base64 encoded string on
// success.
private string GetSecurityLayerOutgoingBlob(
string challenge,
NTAuthentication clientContext) {
// must have a security layer challenge
if (challenge == null)
return null;
// "unwrap" challenge
byte[] input = Convert.FromBase64String(challenge);
int len;
try {
len = clientContext.VerifySignature(input, 0, input.Length);
}
catch (Win32Exception) {
// any decrypt failure is an auth failure
return null;
}
// Per RFC 2222 Section 7.2.2:
// the client should then expect the server to issue a
// token in a subsequent challenge. The client passes
// this token to GSS_Unwrap and interprets the first
// octet of cleartext as a bit-mask specifying the
// security layers supported by the server and the
// second through fourth octets as the maximum size
// output_message to send to the server.
// Section 7.2.3
// The security layer and their corresponding bit-masks
// are as follows:
// 1 No security layer
// 2 Integrity protection
// Sender calls GSS_Wrap with conf_flag set to FALSE
// 4 Privacy protection
// Sender calls GSS_Wrap with conf_flag set to TRUE
//
// Exchange 2007 and our client only support
// "No security layer". Therefore verify first byte is value 1
// and the 2nd-4th bytes are value zero since token size is not
// applicable when there is no security layer.
if (len < 4 || // expect 4 bytes
input[0] != 1 || // first value 1
input[1] != 0 || // rest value 0
input[2] != 0 ||
input[3] != 0) {
return null;
}
// Continuing with RFC 2222 section 7.2.2:
// The client then constructs data, with the first octet
// containing the bit-mask specifying the selected security
// layer, the second through fourth octets containing in
// network byte order the maximum size output_message the client
// is able to receive, and the remaining octets containing the
// authorization identity.
//
// So now this contructs the "wrapped" response. The response is
// payload is identical to the received server payload and the
// "authorization identity" is not supplied as it is unnecessary.
// let MakeSignature figure out length of output
byte[] output = null;
try {
len = clientContext.MakeSignature(input, 0, 4, ref output);
}
catch (Win32Exception) {
// any decrypt failure is an auth failure
return null;
}
// return Base64 encoded string of signed payload
return Convert.ToBase64String(output, 0, len);
}
}
}
// File provided for Reference Use Only by Microsoft Corporation (c) 2007.
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
// Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
//
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
namespace System.Net.Mail
{
using System;
using System.Collections;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Security.Permissions;
using System.ComponentModel;
using System.Security.Authentication.ExtendedProtection;
internal class SmtpNegotiateAuthenticationModule : ISmtpAuthenticationModule
{
Hashtable sessions = new Hashtable();
internal SmtpNegotiateAuthenticationModule()
{
}
#region ISmtpAuthenticationModule Members
// Security this method will access NetworkCredential properties that demand UnmanagedCode and Environment Permission
[EnvironmentPermission(SecurityAction.Assert, Unrestricted=true)]
[SecurityPermission(SecurityAction.Assert, Flags=SecurityPermissionFlag.UnmanagedCode)]
public Authorization Authenticate(string challenge, NetworkCredential credential, object sessionCookie, string spn, ChannelBinding channelBindingToken)
{
if(Logging.On)Logging.Enter(Logging.Web, this, "Authenticate", null);
try {
lock (this.sessions)
{
NTAuthentication clientContext = this.sessions[sessionCookie] as NTAuthentication;
if (clientContext == null)
{
if(credential == null){
return null;
}
this.sessions[sessionCookie] =
clientContext =
new NTAuthentication(false, "Negotiate", credential, spn,
ContextFlags.Connection | ContextFlags.InitIntegrity, channelBindingToken);
}
byte[] byteResp;
string resp = null;
if (!clientContext.IsCompleted) {
// If auth is not yet completed keep producing
// challenge responses with GetOutgoingBlob
SecurityStatus statusCode;
byte[] decodedChallenge = null;
if (challenge != null) {
decodedChallenge =
Convert.FromBase64String(challenge);
}
byteResp = clientContext.GetOutgoingBlob(
decodedChallenge,
false,
out statusCode);
// Note sure why this is here...keeping it.
if (clientContext.IsCompleted && byteResp == null) {
resp = "\r\n";
}
if (byteResp != null) {
resp = Convert.ToBase64String(byteResp);
}
} else {
// If auth completed and still have a challenge then
// server may be doing "correct" form of GSSAPI SASL.
// Validate incoming and produce outgoing SASL security
// layer negotiate message.
resp = GetSecurityLayerOutgoingBlob(
challenge,
clientContext);
}
return new Authorization(resp, clientContext.IsCompleted);
}
}
finally {
if(Logging.On)Logging.Exit(Logging.Web, this, "Authenticate", null);
}
}
public string AuthenticationType
{
get
{
return "gssapi";
}
}
public void CloseContext(object sessionCookie) {
NTAuthentication clientContext = null;
lock (sessions) {
clientContext = sessions[sessionCookie] as NTAuthentication;
if (clientContext != null) {
sessions.Remove(sessionCookie);
}
}
if (clientContext != null) {
clientContext.CloseContext();
}
}
#endregion
// Function for SASL security layer negotiation after
// authorization completes.
//
// Returns null for failure, Base64 encoded string on
// success.
private string GetSecurityLayerOutgoingBlob(
string challenge,
NTAuthentication clientContext) {
// must have a security layer challenge
if (challenge == null)
return null;
// "unwrap" challenge
byte[] input = Convert.FromBase64String(challenge);
int len;
try {
len = clientContext.VerifySignature(input, 0, input.Length);
}
catch (Win32Exception) {
// any decrypt failure is an auth failure
return null;
}
// Per RFC 2222 Section 7.2.2:
// the client should then expect the server to issue a
// token in a subsequent challenge. The client passes
// this token to GSS_Unwrap and interprets the first
// octet of cleartext as a bit-mask specifying the
// security layers supported by the server and the
// second through fourth octets as the maximum size
// output_message to send to the server.
// Section 7.2.3
// The security layer and their corresponding bit-masks
// are as follows:
// 1 No security layer
// 2 Integrity protection
// Sender calls GSS_Wrap with conf_flag set to FALSE
// 4 Privacy protection
// Sender calls GSS_Wrap with conf_flag set to TRUE
//
// Exchange 2007 and our client only support
// "No security layer". Therefore verify first byte is value 1
// and the 2nd-4th bytes are value zero since token size is not
// applicable when there is no security layer.
if (len < 4 || // expect 4 bytes
input[0] != 1 || // first value 1
input[1] != 0 || // rest value 0
input[2] != 0 ||
input[3] != 0) {
return null;
}
// Continuing with RFC 2222 section 7.2.2:
// The client then constructs data, with the first octet
// containing the bit-mask specifying the selected security
// layer, the second through fourth octets containing in
// network byte order the maximum size output_message the client
// is able to receive, and the remaining octets containing the
// authorization identity.
//
// So now this contructs the "wrapped" response. The response is
// payload is identical to the received server payload and the
// "authorization identity" is not supplied as it is unnecessary.
// let MakeSignature figure out length of output
byte[] output = null;
try {
len = clientContext.MakeSignature(input, 0, 4, ref output);
}
catch (Win32Exception) {
// any decrypt failure is an auth failure
return null;
}
// return Base64 encoded string of signed payload
return Convert.ToBase64String(output, 0, len);
}
}
}
// File provided for Reference Use Only by Microsoft Corporation (c) 2007.
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